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Abstract: The emergence of Airbus transformed the market structure of the LCA
industry into a duopoly of similar-sized full-range manufacturers. The ﬁnancing of
Airbus’s upfront investment expenditures came in a signiﬁcant proportion from
public funds, which violated, in the US’s opinion the SCM Agreement. While the
Appellate Body follows this view of things to a large extent, it does so in a
measured way: the category of per se illegal export subsidies is interpreted with a
view to the manipulation of normal market conditions; the distortion on
competitive conditions matters, not the increase of exports as such. Other aspects
of subsidies law clariﬁed are the relationship between effect and subsidy. They are
closely related but not identical; rightly, the report operates from the premise that
the SCM Agreement’s regime focuses on the effect, and not on the subsidy as such,
which is a manifestation of a political choice by a sovereign Member state. The
Appellate Body afﬁrms that a subsidy has a ‘life’, a shorthand for a beginning and
an end: it follows that the effect of a subsidy is not bound to be permanent but is
bound to terminate. It is to be regretted that the Appellate Body avoided clarifying
to what extent partial privatization, hence sale of assets at market prices to private
investors, ‘extinguish’ subsidies.
1. Introduction
A comprehensive analysis of this seminal Report (‘the Airbus Report’) will require
more than one Ph.D. thesis: After all, we are talking of a Report that was more than
nine months in the making (after a Panel had toiled on the case for ﬁve years), with
three distinguished Appellate Body Members (Unterhalter, Bautista, Van den
Bossche) and the Secretariat lawyers1 authoring some 650 pages, with the operative
1 The notice of appeal is dated 12 August 2010, and the Report was circulated on 18 May 2011.
However, it is a fair assumption that the Appellate Body Secretariat was starting to work on this Report
signiﬁcantly earlier.
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part of the Report starting at page 270. For an institution that prides itself of its
Swiss-watch precision (and distinguishes it from some panels) this is, if not a
record, then at least one of the longer periods spent on an appeal. We shall not
undertake, in the framework of this paper, to analyze in-depth all major issues
addressed in the Report. Rather, we understand this small piece as an amuse
bouche that is supposed to whet the appetite for more. Hence, we will limit
ourselves to highlight certain aspects of the decision we consider particularly
interesting and worthy of discussion.
It is to be reminded that the Airbus Report is part of the on-going Airbus–Boeing
saga2, which also led, in 2012, to the Appellate Body Report United
States –Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft – Second Complaint
(WT/DS353) that will be reported next year: the United States and the European
Union, respectively, claim that the other partner is unfairly subsidizing its producer
of large civil aircrafts (‘LCA’).
The emergence of Airbus transformed the market structure of the LCA industry
from that of a dominant incumbent with two fringe producers with a narrow
product range into a duopoly of similar-sized full-range manufacturers. The
ﬁnancing of Airbus’s important upfront investment expenditures came in a
signiﬁcant proportion from public funds. The rivalry between Boeing and Airbus
on the global market has resulted in new product launches which, together with
competition between the LCA manufacturers for orders, signiﬁcantly increased
global demand, but which has shown a relative decline in the preponderant
position of Boeing.
The Airbus case was initiated by the United States in late 2004;3 the Panel was
established on 20 July 2005 and issued its Report some ﬁve years later on 30 June
2010, exceeding considerably the nine months allocated to the Panel phase by the
DSU.4 The European Union appealed, and the Appellate Body Report was adopted
on 1 June 2011.
At issue were more than 300 instances of alleged support measures by France,
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and by the EC itself over almost four
decades. The measures included: the provision of ﬁnancing for design and
development to Airbus companies (‘launch aid’); the provision of grants and
government-provided goods and services to develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus
manufacturing sites for the development and production of the Airbus A380; the
provision of loans on preferential terms; the assumption and forgiveness of debt
resulting from launch and other large-civil-aircraft production and development
2 See Douglas A. Irwin and Nina Pavcnik (December 2001), ‘Airbus versus Boeing Revisited:
International Competition in the Aircraft Market’, NBER Working Paper No. 8648.
3European Communities and Certain Member States –Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft –Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS316/1.
4 Cf. Brendan McGivern (2010), ‘Aircraft Subsidies and WTO Rules: The Airbus Decision’, 35:4/5 Air
and Space Law, 305–315.
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ﬁnancing; the provision of equity infusions and grants; the provision of research
and development loans and grants in support of large-civil-aircraft development,
directly for the beneﬁt of Airbus, and any other measures involving a ﬁnancial
contribution to the Airbus companies. The alleged subsidies relate to the entire
family of Airbus planes (A300 through the A380).
Whereas all these measures were, in the US view, subsidies pursuant to Articles 1
and 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM
Agreement’ or ‘SCM’) causing adverse effects (Articles 5, 6 SCM), the United States
further alleged that certain launch aid provided for the A340 and A380 violated the
absolute prohibition of Article 3 SCM Agreement to make subsidies contingent on
export performance.
2. Claims before the Appellate Body5
The main issues that were presented to the AB related to:
(i) the temporal scope and life of a subsidy in application of Article 5 SCM,
(ii) the interpretation of extinguishment, extraction, and pass-through of subsidies
under the provisions of Articles 1, 4.7, 5, 6, and 7.8 SCM,
(iii) the appropriate calculation of beneﬁt of certain subsidies (‘Launch Aids’)
according to the market-investor principle in line with Articles 1 and 14(b) SCM,
(iv) the determination of what is a de facto export subsidy pursuant to Article 3.1 (a)
SCM,
(v) the weight to be given to a realistic product and geographic-market deﬁnition in
a case involving Article 6.3(a) and (b) SCM, and
(vi) the assessment of product displacement and lost sales under Article 6.3(a) and
(b) SCM.
3. Issues of particular interest
I.
1. The WTO’s subsidy’s regime is not about prohibiting subsidies per se (the lone
exception, export subsidies, will be discussed immediately, Subsection II). Rather, it
is merely imposing the obligation to do no harm to fellow Members through the
granting of state aid.6 Maybe clearer than ever before, the Appellate Body explains
that subsidy and caused effect are two different issues, and that the former is – from
5Appellate Body Report, Airbus, paras. 571 (issues raised by the European Union) and 572 (issues
raised by the United States).
6 For a timely and comprehensive overview, cf. Petros C. Mavroidis, Patrick A. Messerlin, and Jasper
M. Wauters (eds.) (2008), The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO, Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing; Marc Bacchetta and Michele Ruta (eds.) (2011), The WTO, Subsidies and
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a substantive perspective7 – of interest to Article 5 SCM only as a cause to the latter
(unless it is not a priori verboten, pursuant to Article 3 SCM).8
2. Several consequences arise from this. Firstly, as the SCM focuses on effect and
not on cause, the EU argument that subsidies granted – and, possibly, subsidy
programs started – before the entry into force of the SCM were immune from its
disciplines was a non-starter.9
Secondly, this constellation gives occasion to rethink the issue of the ‘life of a
subsidy’ and the Appellate Body takes this invitation up with almost palpable
gusto. While it ﬂatly rejects the European Union’s proposition ‘that there must be
“present beneﬁt” during the reference period’,10 the proposition that a subsidy has
a ‘life’ is explicitly recognized:
[It] may come to an end, either through the removal of the ﬁnancial contribution
and/or the expiration of the beneﬁt . . .where it is so argued, a panel must assess
whether there are ‘intervening events’ that occurred after the grant of the subsidy
that may affect the projected value of the subsidy as determined under the ex ante
analysis. Such events may be relevant to an adverse effects analysis because they
may affect the link that a complaining party is seeking to establish between the
subsidy and its alleged effects.11
Countervailing Measures, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing; Luca Rubini (2010), The Deﬁnition
of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective, New York: Oxford University
Press; Pietro Poretti (2009), The Regulation of Subsidies within the General Agreement on Trade in
Services of the WTO: Problems and Prospects, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International; Kostantinos Adamantopoulos and Maria Jesus Pereyra-Friedrichsen (2007), EU Anti-
subsidy Law and Practice, London: Sweet & Maxwell; Marc Benitah (2001), The Law of Subsidies under
the GATT/WTO System, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International; Fabian Böhm
(2007), Strukturen internationalen Subventionsrechts: EG-Beihilfenrecht und WTO-Subventionsrecht aus
rechtsvergleichender Perspektive, Frankfurt: Peter Lang. For valuable context cf. Andrew L. Stoler (2010),
‘The Evolution of Subsidies Disciplines in GATT and the WTO’, 44:4 Journal of World Trade, 797–808;
Debra P. Steger (2010), ‘The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement: Ahead of Its Time or
Time for Reform?’, 44:4 Journal of World Trade, 779–796.
7 Procedurally, it is of great interest to determine whether the decision of the Appellate Body only covers
speciﬁc subsidies or, rather, a subsidy program. If the latter is the case, new manifestations of that program
are covered by the pertinent decision of the DSB and thus allow the complainant to resort to procedures
under Article 21.5 DSU, and thus to speedier resolutions. If the former is the case, any dissatisfaction
caused due to harm incurred will have to be resolved by a new complaint: see para. 7.514 et seq. of the
Panel Report and para. 471 et seq. of the Appellate Body Report.
8 See the wording of Article 5 SCM: ‘NoMember should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred
to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a) injury to the
domestic industry of another Member; (b) nulliﬁcation or impairment of beneﬁts accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the beneﬁts of concessions bound under
Article II of GATT 1994; (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.’
9 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 655 et seq., in particular 681–690.
10 Ibid., para. 711. As a consequence of the European Union’s mistaken interpretation of Article 5 (and
6) SCM, it ‘conﬂate[d] present adverse effects, which must be demonstrated under Article 6.3, with present
subsidization, which need not’ (ibid., para. 712).
11 Ibid., para. 709.
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Focusing on the nexus between subsidy and its alleged effect, the Appellate Body
explained:
At the time of the grant of a subsidy, the subsidy will necessarily be projected to
have a ﬁnite life and to be utilized over that ﬁnite period. In order properly to
assess a complaint under Article 5 that a subsidy causes adverse effects, a panel
must take into account that a subsidy provided accrues and diminishes over time,
and will have a ﬁnite life. The adverse effects analysis under Article 5 is distinct
from the ‘beneﬁt’ analysis under Article 1.1(b) of the SCMAgreement and there is
consequently no need to re-evaluate under Article 5 the amount of the beneﬁt
conferred pursuant to Article 1.1(b). Rather, an adverse effects analysis under
Article 5 must consider the trajectory of the subsidy as it was projected to
materialize over a certain period at the time of the grant.12
In sum, a panel’s analysis of the adverse effects must take into account how the
subsidy has materialized over time. As part of this analysis, a panel must assess
how the subsidy is affected, both by the depreciation of the subsidy that was
projected ex ante and the ‘intervening events’ referred to by a party that may have
occurred following its grant.13
Thus, one may visualize the life-span of the subsidy as such and its effects as
parallel curve graphs, which are not identical but rather in a sequencing order and
may be partially overlapping.
3. Of course, it is one thing to embrace the concept that a subsidy must have
an end, and another one to ofﬁcially determine the ‘time of death’ – and the effect
on the adverse-effect analysis under Article 5 SCM. The European Union had
argued that ‘sales of shares between private entities, and sales conducted in
the context of partial privatizations’ had eliminated all or part of past subsidies.14
In support of this proposition, it had invoked the Appellate Body Reports in US–
Lead and Bismuth II15 and US–Countervailing Measures on Certain EC
Products.16
12 Ibid.
13 [Footnote in the original] For this reason, we disagree with the Panel, at paragraphs 7.224, 7.225,
and 7.266 of the Panel Report, insofar as it suggests that a consideration of ‘intervening events’, such as the
‘extinction’ and ‘extraction’ of subsidies, are not relevant under an adverse-effects analysis.
14 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 724.
15 Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R; see Gene
M. Grossman and Petros C. Mavroidis (2003), ‘United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom: Here
Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies’, in Henrik
Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), The WTO Case Law of 2001, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 170–200; see also Sherzod Shadikhodjaev (2012), ‘How to Pass a Pass-Through Test: The Case
of Input Subsidies’, 15:2 Journal of International Economic Law, 621–646.
16 Appellate Body Report,United States –Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from
the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R.
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Rightly, the Appellate Body highlights that both Reports only ‘stand for the
proposition that a presumption of extinction17 arises where there is a full
privatization’ which involves sales at fair market value, at arm’s length, and a
subsequent full transfer of ownership and control. In Airbus, the Appellate Body
had to examine to what extent a partial privatization and private-to-private sales
had an equivalent effect on the lifespan of the subsidies in question. However, the
three Appellate Body members tasked with DS316 could not agree on one
consolidated position and chose to offer insights into their personal thinking:
(a) Noting that the Appellate Body has previously ruled in privatization cases that a
full privatization, conducted at arm’s length and for fair market value involving
a complete or substantial transfer of ownership and control, ‘extinguishes’ prior
subsidies, one Member is of the view that this rule does not apply to partial
privatizations or to private-to-private sales.
(b) One Member noted that, as discussed above, the Appellate Body ruled in US–
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products that . . . full privatization at
arm’s length and for fair market value may result in extinguishing the beneﬁt
received from the nonrecurring ﬁnancial contribution bestowed upon a state-
owned ﬁrm18 . . . This Member considers the rationale underlying the Appellate
Body’s case law on full privatization in the context of Part V of the SCM
Agreement equally to apply in situations of partial privatization and private-to-
private transactions and in the context of Part III of the SCM Agreement.
However, this Member also notes that, as the Appellate Body emphasized inUS–
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, there is ‘no inﬂexible rule’
that a ‘beneﬁt’ derived from pre-privatization ﬁnancial contributions expires
following privatization at arm’s length and for fair market value.19 Rather . . .
‘[i]t depends on the facts of each case’.20 An important question in this context
is to what extent the partial privatization or private-to-private transactions
resulted in a transfer of control to new owners who paid fair market value for
shares in the company.
(c) OneMember of the Division, though afﬁrming the general test that an extinction
of beneﬁt is to be determined upon a consideration of all relevant facts,
entertains no small measure of doubt that an acquisition of shares, concluded at
arm’s length and for fair market value, constitutes relevant circumstances
warranting the conclusion that an extinction of beneﬁt has taken place. A
subsidy granted to a recipient company contributes to the net asset value of that
company. The value of that asset permits the recipient to enjoy an enhanced
stream of future earnings over the life of the asset. The asset is the property of the
recipient. The recipient’s shareholders enjoy the right to the dividends that may
17 Emphasis added.
18 Appellate Body Report, US–Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para. 127.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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be declared by the recipient and to any capital gains that arise from the enhanced
earnings attributable to the recipient. When shares change hands on an arm’s-
length basis and for fair market value, the buyer pays a price that, in the
estimation of the buyer, places a proper value on the future earnings of
the recipient. Those earnings derive from all the assets of the recipient, including
the beneﬁt of any subsidy paid to the recipient. One shareholder may not
accurately value or properly manage the assets of the recipient. Precisely for this
reason, sales of shares take place: the buyer believes that the assets, properly
managed, will be worth more over time than the price paid, and the seller
believes the opposite. Time will tell who is correct. The central point is that a sale
of shares, whether or not it conveys control, transfers rights in the shares to a
new owner. The assets of the company, to which the shares attach, do not
change at all. Nor could it be otherwise, because the buyer would then not
acquire the full beneﬁt of the bargain: the buyer would pay for an asset (the
subsidy) that had in the very sales transaction been ‘extinguished’. Shares in
listed companies are traded on stock exchanges with great frequency and
without any fear that sales on the market diminish the underlying value of the
assets owned by these companies. The changing price of listed securities reﬂects
the different valuations that buyers and sellers place upon companies and their
underlying assets. However, nothing about these trades extracts the value of any
asset, including the beneﬁt of any subsidy granted. That subsidy continues to
beneﬁt the recipient, even if the ownership of the recipient’s shares changes from
one day to another. Given that the Appellate Body in this case does not need to
come to any ﬁnal view on the issue of extinction in the context of a partial
privatization or private-to-private sales, these matters do not require more
deﬁnitive determination.
The Appellate Body had the luxury to not decide the issue as it was of the opinion
that the Panel’s analysis had drastically fallen short of what was required in the
matter: arguments of the European Union with regard to the quality of the
transactions in question had, in the Appellate Body’s view, not received
due attention, both with regard to factual ﬁndings and the care with which the
arguments of the European Union had been dealt with. This reluctance of the
Appellate Body is to be regretted; more clarity on this point would have been most
welcome.
4. In addition, the Appellate Body rejected the European Union’s proposition that
the removal of cash from two Airbus partners constituted an ‘extraction’ of
subsidies. Recognizing this possibility in principle, it decided that the transactions
brought forward by the European Union were not ‘of such a nature, kind, and
amount as to be relevant to its adverse effects analysis’. In particular, it doubted the
existence of a speciﬁc relationship between subsidy and cash removal:
we do consider that, at a minimum, the European Communities was required to
explain how the speciﬁc subsidies received by Dasa and CASA were reﬂected in
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the balance sheets of those companies, and how the cash removed or ‘extracted’
represented the remaining or unused value of these subsidies. The mere assertion
by the European Communities, without more, that subsidies to Dasa and CASA
increased the value of those companies and that therefore any cash taken out
represents the subsidy or its ‘incremental value’, does not in our view satisfy the
requirement of establishing a ‘causal relationship’ between the ‘cash extraction’
and the subsidy.21
A second criterion, namely ‘whether it had been demonstrated that the extracted
cash permanently left or moved beyond the reach of the “company-shareholder
unit”’ could be left to be analyzed on another day.
5. How to calculate the beneﬁt provided by Launch ﬁnance from the four EU
Member states concerned? When answering this question, the Appellate Body had
the beneﬁt of having had been exposed to numerous arguments from the parties to
the dispute on how to deﬁne the relevant benchmark for the ex-ante-rate-of-return
that would have been the threshold for market investors to undertake investment.
For all practical purposes, the question focuses on the risk premium a rational
private investor would demand in order to engage ﬁnancially with regard to the
different LCA product launches. Emphasizing that point, the Appellate Body’s
Report22 stresses that the assessment has to take place on an ex ante perspective,
i.e. as if it was taken when the proﬁt-maximizing lender and cost-averse borrower
commit to the transaction. How the loan actually performed over time is irrelevant:
the beneﬁt of hindsight is denied even to the most astute private investors.
6. The central issue analyzed by the Appellate Body in regard to assessing
whether the challenged ﬁnancing measures confer beneﬁt concerns can be
separated into two questions: ﬁrstly, whether a single ﬁxed project speciﬁc-risk
premium for all LCA product launches (derived from a 2004 study of venture
capital investments) represents an appropriate quantiﬁcation or whether a more
accurate estimate is that obtained from anticipated returns of a sample of risk-
sharing suppliers to A 380. In its assessment, the Appellate Body identiﬁes23
technical problems and inconsistencies in both alternatives. Nevertheless, as both
attempts to quantify the appropriate risk premium come to the conclusion that the
challenged Launch Aid/Member States’ Financing measures do not fully reﬂect
market conditions at the time, the Appellate Body accepts that the LA/MSF
measures confer a beneﬁt within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) SCM Agreement. A
signiﬁcant missing element is, however, the lack of a quantitative estimate of the
subsidy element represented by LA/MSF measures, thus impeding a realistic and
21Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 746.
22 Ibid., paras. 836 and 837.
23 Ibid., paras. 923–928.
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robust analysis of the actual displacement orders data when considering that
Boeing was receiving subsidies over much of the same period.
II.
1. To the extent they entail the damaging effects on fellow WTO members,
enumerated in Article 5 SCM Agreement, subsidies stop being a purely internal
method of states inﬂuencing the behavior of their economic operators and turn into
a matter of interest for WTO law. If a state can show that another state’s subsidy
has the negative impact described in Article 5 SCM Agreement, it can react, either
by attacking the subsidy in the multilateral DSU procedure, or unilaterally by
offsetting the harming consequences through countervailing duties.
However, there is a mortal sin that is so wrong (according to the contracting
parties to the SCM Agreement) that no concrete adverse-effect damage needs to be
shown: a subsidy is, pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 SCM, per se prohibited (and thus:
attackable and countervailable in a particularly swift and sharp manner) if it is (de
iure or de facto) conditional upon either export performance or upon the use of
domestic over-imported goods.24 Article 3 SCM reads in its relevant parts:
[T]he following subsidies . . . shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4, whether solely or as one of several other
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I; []
Original Footnote 4 reads:
This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy,
without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.
2. The measures attacked by the US complaint were not contingent in law: none
of the legal documents forming the legal basis for the support measures established
that the beneﬁt granted was conditional upon Airbus exports.
3. Of course, Airbus operates in a global market (see infra, Subsection III.2). If it
was to be a commercial success, it had to acquire market share in the global and
(provided they really exist) in regional markets. And while many details about the
future champions of the global commercial airline industry were not foreseeable at
the time when decisions were made, it was crystal clear that without export markets
the project would, quite literally, not ﬂy: how could, for example, the A 380 not be
24Mavroidis et al. (2008), above note 6, p. 293.
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an economic debacle, unless it acquired signiﬁcant market share in the Gulf and in
the Asia-Paciﬁc region? Despite the US suspicion that EU states subsidize no matter
what, European taxpayers expected, given the amounts at stake, at least a
signiﬁcant part of their money back. And that was only to happen if non-EU orders
would ﬁll Airbus books.
Relying on detail-rich and not necessarily always completely clear prior Appellate
Body case law, the United States could hence make a plausible claim that what the
Europeans had done amounted to an a priori illegal export subsidy, and should be
subjected to the most far-reaching sanctions25 in WTO law: wasn’t the grant of
subsidies based on the expectation that Airbus would be an export success? The link
between subsidy and export expectation fulﬁlled, in the complainant’s view, the
essence of what an export subsidy is: pay-outs tied to export performance. The Panel
bought into that narrative: without reasonable expectation of export performance,
no business case for Airbus; without a business case, no subsidies; de facto thus, the
Panel opined, the subsidies were tied to export performance, contingent in fact upon
exports. In doing so, it relied heavily on the fact that sometimes the documentations
of the ﬁnancing included speciﬁc references to exports while this was not the case in
others. In the latter case, the Panel accepted that these were actionable subsidies
whereas in the former the rough justice26 of the SCM’s Part II applied.
4. Prior case law with regard to de facto contingency may be summarized as
follows: the Appellate Body Report on Brazil–Aircraft (Article 21.5–Canada)27
clariﬁed that a subsidy coming under the purview of the Illustrative List28 was ipso
facto prohibited; a complainant need not show in detail that the general
requirements of Article 3.1 SCM are met. To the contrary, if a support measure
does not appear on the Illustrative List, the complainant will have to demonstrate
that the subsidizing state ‘either in law or in fact’ made payment conditional on
either exports or the use of domestic goods.
In Canada –Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (‘Canada–
Aircraft’),29 the Appellate Body, paying particular attention to the SCM’s
footnote 4, decided that mere knowledge of the beneﬁciary’s exporting activities
25 For prohibited subsidies, the normal rules of the DSU do not apply. Given that they are ranked at the
highest order of WTO violation, deadlines are shortened signiﬁcantly; cf. Andrew Green and Michael
Trebilcock (2007), ‘Enforcing WTO Obligations: What Can We Learn from Export Subsidies?’, 10:3
Journal of International Economic Law, 653–683.
26 Cf.Reid v.Covert, 354 US 1, at 35–36: ‘military justice has been a rough form of justice emphasizing
summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties’.
27Brazil –Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Second recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the
DSU (WT/DS46/RW/2) 26 July 2001 (Brazil–Aircraft (Article 21.5–Canada)).
28 An Illustrative List to the SCM (Annex I) offers a nonexhaustive list of prohibited export subsidies
which indicates 12 types of support measures.
29 Appellate Body Report, Canada –Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/
R (Canada–Aircraft).
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would not sufﬁce for the de facto threshold to be met. Something more is required,
the Appellate Body explained:
The second substantive element in footnote 4 is ‘tied to’. The ordinary meaning of
‘tied to’ conﬁrms the linkage of ‘contingency’ with ‘conditionality’ in Article
3.1(a). Among the manymeanings of the verb ‘tie’, we believe that, in this instance,
because the word ‘tie’ is immediately followed by the word ‘to’ in footnote 4, the
relevant ordinary meaning of ‘tie’ must be to ‘limit or restrict as to . . . conditions’.
This element of the standard set forth in footnote 4, therefore, emphasizes that a
relationship of conditionality or dependence must be demonstrated . . . In any given
case, the facts must ‘demonstrate’ that the granting of a subsidy is tied to or
contingent upon actual or anticipated exports. It does not sufﬁce to demonstrate
solely that a government granting a subsidy anticipated that exports would result.
Canada–Aircraft then cautioned:
The second sentence of footnote 4 precludes a panel from making a ﬁnding of de
facto export contingency for the sole reason that the subsidy is ‘granted to
enterprises which export’ . . . The second sentence of footnote 4 is, therefore, a
speciﬁc expression of the requirement in the ﬁrst sentence to demonstrate the ‘tied
to’ requirement.30
. . . De jure export contingency is demonstrated on the basis of the words of the
relevant legislation, regulation or legal instrument. Proving de facto export
contingency is a much more difﬁcult task. There is no single legal document which
will demonstrate, on its face, that a subsidy is ‘contingent . . . in fact . . . upon export
performance’. Instead, the existence of this relationship of contingency, between
the subsidy and the export performance, must be inferred from the total
conﬁguration of the facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the
subsidy, none of which on its own is likely to be decisive in any given case . . .We
note that satisfaction of the standard for determining de facto export contingency
set out in footnote 4 requires proof of three different substantive elements: ﬁrst,
‘the granting of a subsidy’; second, ‘is . . . tied to . . . ’; and third, ‘actual or
anticipated exportation or export earnings.’31
30 Ibid., para. 174 (italics and emphasis in the original).
31 Ibid., paras. 169 and 175. The Appellate Body Report onUnited States –Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign
Sales Corporations’ –Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/
RW, adopted 29 January 2002, DSR 2002:I, 55 (US–FSC (Article 21.5–EC)), citing prior relevant case law,
provided its understanding of the evidentiary standard associated with a proof that a de jure export subsidy
indeed occurred: ‘We recall that in Canada–Autos, we stated: . . . a subsidy is contingent “in law” upon
export performance when the existence of that condition can be demonstrated on the basis of the very
words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument constituting the measure . . . [F]or a
subsidy to be de jure export contingent, the underlying legal instrument does not always have to provide
expressis verbis that the subsidy is available only upon fulﬁlment of the condition of export performance.
Such conditionality can also be derived by necessary implication from the words actually used in the
measure.’ US–FSC (Article 21.5–EC II), para. 112; see also Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers
and Exporters of Automotive Leather (Article 21.5 –US), WT/DS126/RW and Corr. 1, adopted
11 February 2000 (Australia–Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5–US)), paras. 9.36–9.66.
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5. The Airbus Report develops that body of law:32 far from breaking with prior
precedents, it clearly adds new elements to the deﬁnition of an export subsidy under
Article 3 SCM.Whereas the Panel had ‘equated the standard of export contingency
with the reasons(s) for granting a subsidy’33 – and probably could do so reasonably
expecting to be in line with prior Appellate Body jurisprudence – the Appellate
Body, this time in no uncertain terms, rejects a ‘standard that requires anticipated
exportation to be the reason for the granting of the subsidy’.34 It explicitly states
that ‘the standard for de facto export contingency is [neither] met . . . by showing
that anticipated exportation is the reason for granting the subsidy . . . [nor by
showing] the subjective motivation of the granting government to promote the
future export performance of the recipient’.35
Rather, building on its prior jurisprudence, the Appellate Body developes the
notion that a subsidy must be ‘geared to the promotion of exports’:
Because anticipated exportation ‘alone is not proof that the granting of the
subsidy is tied to the anticipation of exportation’,36 the legal standard for de facto
export contingency under Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement
further requires that there exists a relationship of conditionality between the
granting of the subsidy and anticipated exportation. Where a subsidy is alleged to
be ‘in fact tied to . . . anticipated exportation’, the relationship of conditionality is,
unlike in the case of de jure export contingency, not expressly or by necessary
implication . . . can be established by recourse to the following test: is the granting
of the subsidy geared to induce the promotion of future export performance by
the recipient?37
The new operative word for describing the special nexus between export
performance and the granting of a subsidy is the term geared. The Report uses it
20 times, indicating that its drafters wanted to let the world know that a new
concept has been added to pre-existing case law. What does it mean, then? The
Appellate Body answers this question in para. 1045 of its Report:
Rather . . . the standard for de facto export contingency under Article 3.1(a) and
footnote 4 of the SCMAgreementwould be met when the subsidy is granted so as
to provide an incentive to the recipient to export in a way that is not simply
reﬂective of the conditions of supply and demand in the domestic and export
markets undistorted by the granting of the subsidy.
32 For an understandably partial and excellent analysis see James Flett (2012), ‘From Political Pre-
occupation to Legitimate Rule against Market Partitioning: Export Subsidies in WTO Law after the
Appellate Body Ruling in the Airbus Case’, 7:2 Global Trade and Customs Journal, 50–58.
33 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1063.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., para. 1064.
36 [Original Footnote 2342] Appellate Body Report, Canada–Aircraft, para. 172 (original emphasis).
37 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1044 (emphasis added).
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In line with other tests established by the Appellate Body that are supposed to
avoid the appearance to examine, horibile dictu, intent,38 the Appellate Body
establishes pro forma objective criteria that are, nevertheless, not free from highly
subjective connotations:
The standard for determining whether the granting of a subsidy is ‘in fact tied
to . . . the existence of de facto export contingency . . . ‘must be inferred from the
total conﬁguration of the facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the
subsidy’, which may include the following factors: (i) the design and structure of
the measure granting the subsidy; (ii) the modalities of operation set out in such a
measure; and (iii) the relevant factual circumstances surrounding the granting of
the subsidy that provide the context for understanding the measure’s design,
structure, and modalities of operation.39 . . . [This] is an objective
standard . . . Indeed, the conditional relationship between the granting of the
subsidy and export performance must be objectively observable on the basis of
such evidence in order for the subsidy to be geared to induce the promotion of
future export performance by the recipient.40
To what extent does that test establish a standard that deviates from de jure
export subsidies? After all, it may be imaginable that an explicit linkage between
export performance and the granting of a subsidy would not qualify as an
‘incentive to the recipient to export in a way that is not simply reﬂective of the
conditions of supply and demand in the domestic and export markets undistorted
by the granting of the subsidy’. An explicit reference in (domestic) law or in an
executive act would then sufﬁce to render a previously as such perfectly legal
subsidy – subject only to the limitation to not create the consequences described in
Article 5 SCM – into one of the rare instances where the WTOAgreement explicitly
states that a state measure is prohibited, and thus utterly illegal, subject to the
harshest procedural treatment dispended by the WTOAgreement.41 So could there
be a difference between the standard applicable to de jure export subsidies and
those applicable to de facto export subsidies?
Upon closer inspection – and absent laboratory conditions that the Appellate
Body does not view as the appropriate test environment42 – it seems difﬁcult to
38 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1050: ‘The standard for de facto export contingency is
therefore not satisﬁed by the subjective motivation of the granting government to promote the future export
performance of the recipient.’
39 Ibid., para. 1046.
40 Ibid., para. 1050.
41 See the analysis by Konstantinos Adamantopoulos and Vassilis Akritidis (2008), ‘Article 3 SCMA’,
in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, andMichael Koebele (eds.),Max-Planck Commentaries onWorld
Trade Law, Vol. IV (WTO–Trade Remedies), Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
pp. 471–486.
42 The Appellate Body subscribes to the notion that assessments should be made in the ‘real world
where people live, work and die’: Appellate Body Report, EC –Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26 and WT/DS48, para. 187.
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imagine an explicit conditionality between the granting of public funds and export
performance that would not constitute an incentive to export more, both in
absolute and relative terms, than would have been the case under exposure to
normal market inﬂuences. That would meet the standard established in Airbus – it
should be recalled: an evidentiary standard! – for de facto export subsidies. Because
the difference between the WTO regimes for a priori illegal export subsidies and for
normal state aid are so stark (in both theory and procedural practice), some nexus
between subsidy and export performance does not sufﬁce to declare measures of a
sovereign Member a priori illegal. In the case of the de iure export subsidy, the
support measure is explicitly and manifestly contingent on export performance.43
Of course, the interpretation of the wording of a text allegedly establishing de iure
contingency may prove difﬁcult, and in that case the interpreter will take guidance
from the Airbus Report.
To sum up this point: in line with the general rules, it behooves the complainant
to show (and to the adjudicatory bodies of the WTO to establish) that the state
measure in question skews market conditions in order to view support measures as
per se illegal export subsidies; if it cannot be shown that a subsidy is geared to
induce more exports, contrary to market conditions, then it qualiﬁes as a regular
subsidy, actionable pursuant to part III of the SCM Agreement, but not one that
merits summary justice and a priori condemnation.
It is in that light that the test whether a subsidy has been geared to induce the
promotion of future export performance by the recipient has to be administered.
Firstly, hindsight must not come into play: the test ‘must be assessed on the basis of
the information available to the granting authority at the time the subsidy is
granted’.44 The Appellate Body deﬁnes high thresholds:
[W]here relevant evidence exists, the assessment could be based on a comparison
between, on the one hand, the ratio of anticipated export and domestic sales of
the subsidized product that would come about in consequence of the granting of
the subsidy, and, on the other hand, the situation in the absence of the subsidy.
The situation in the absence of the subsidy may be understood on the basis of
historical sales of the same product by the recipient in the domestic and export
markets before the subsidy was granted. In the event that there are no historical
data untainted by the subsidy,45 or the subsidized product is a new product for
which no historical data exists, the comparison could be made with the
performance that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm would hypothetically be expected to
achieve in the export and domestic markets in the absence of the subsidy. Where
the evidence shows, all other things being equal, that the granting of the subsidy
43 ‘De jure export contingency is demonstrated on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation,
regulation or legal instrument. Proving de facto export contingency is a much more difﬁcult task’: Canada–
Aircraft, para. 169 et seq.
44 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1049.
45 Emphasis added.
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provides an incentive to skew anticipated sales towards exports, in comparison
with the historical performance of the recipient or the hypothetical performance
of a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm in the absence of the subsidy, this would be
an indication that the granting of the subsidy is in fact tied to anticipated
exportation within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the SCM
Agreement.
6. The Appellate Body’s Report in EC and Certain Member States–Large Civil
Aircraft is certainly a welcome concretization of previously developed concepts.
Building on previous jurisprudence, it explains for the ﬁrst time in such a clear
fashion that the decisive criterion for de facto export subsidies is the favoring of
exports contrary to market conditions ‘over products destined for domestic
consumption’.46 Only such a restrictive interpretation avoids the absurdity that,
say, most Singaporean subsidies would a priori fall into the category of prohibited
subsidies, as subsidies in a small country with an export-oriented economy will
more often than not be granted in expectation of export performance and in order
to increase such performance.
It would seem that the Appellate Body, in order to avoid pronouncing itself too
ﬁrmly on questions that were either not asked or can, in the Appellate Body’s
opinion, await an answer on another day, refrained from establishing truly
operational standards. In fact, it seems that the Appellate Body is even keen to get
academic feedback, in particular from economists, to incrementally develop this
jurisprudence.
Therefore, the Appellate Body limits itself to establishing some outer parameters
of a new export subsidy deﬁnition, and illustrates it with an example that shows
both the practicability (in the case at hand) but also the remaining, possibly
intended, imprecision.
1048. The following numerical examples illustrate when the granting of a subsidy
may, or may not, be geared to induce promotion of future export performance by
a recipient. Assume that a subsidy is designed to allow a recipient to increase its
future production by ﬁve units. Assume further that the existing ratio of the
recipient’s export sales to domestic sales, at the time the subsidy is granted, is 2:3.
The granting of the subsidy will not be tied to anticipated exportation if, all other
things being equal, the anticipated ratio of export sales to domestic sales is not
greater than the existing ratio. In other words, if, under the measure granting the
subsidy, the recipient would not be expected to export more than two of
the additional ﬁve units to be produced, then this is indicative of the absence of a
tie. By contrast, the granting of the subsidy would be tied to anticipated
exportation if, all other things equal, the recipient is expected to export at least
three of the ﬁve additional units to be produced. In other words, the subsidy is
46 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1053.
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designed in such a way that it is expected to skew the recipient’s future sales in
favour of export sales, even though the recipient may also be expected to increase
its domestic sales.
Export subsidies are per se illegal, because they represent, in the mercantilist
worldview underlying the GATT 1947 and to a large extent the WTO Agreements,
an attack (our French colleagues still write on and teach la guerre commerciale) of a
sovereign state on the (commercial) homeland of another state. Such a scenario, no
doubt, would be caught by the standard offered by the Appellate Body.
The new test, however, deals with more complex and realistic constellations:
imagine a scenario where the homemarket is saturated (yet) inexistent, or a scenario
where the market is really a world market. If, in that case, a producer wants to
expand, the expansion will unavoidably take place not in the domestic market.
While the numerical example suggested by the Appellate Bodywould, at ﬁrst glance,
be cold comfort for such enterprises and the states subsidizing them, the test still
reduces drastically the coverage of prohibited subsidies pursuant to Article 3 SCM:
this is so because the determinative criterion is, according to the Appellate Body,
whether the subsidy would change the export–import ratio that would normally
have developed as a consequence of unfettered supply and demand.
It would seem that in many instances of state support, measures would be far too
complex to be adequately addressed by the complete prohibition of Article 3 SCM.
In the Airbus constellation that was arguably the case: Airbus was also an effort to
be less dependent on a foreign quasi-monopoly, closely related with the military-
industrial complex of that foreign state;47 an effort to create incentives for further
technological leadership, preserve and create professional jobs, and the like. In
those constellations, the regular subsidies regime seems to offer a more appropriate
instrument than part II of the SCM. Arguably these constellations often reﬂect
market situations that cannot be assimilated to the Ceteris Paribus clause (referred
to in paragraph 1047) ‘all other things being equal’. The performance of a proﬁt-
maximizing entrant into a global market dominated by an incumbent with
signiﬁcant market power is likely to be the result of strategic interactions
particularly in regard to product launches, resulting in important and persistent
differentials in the margins on sales to customers depending on the degree to which
the product ranges of the entrant and incumbent are substitutable. Such market
situations can be expected to pose problems for the test proposed since they
demand rigorous deﬁnitions of the geographic and product markets at issue so as to
interpret reliably the trends in domestic and export sales.
Many of the challenges humankind faces in the next century – access to
freshwater, transition to a post-carbon energy environment, global warming,
food security, nano-technology, ﬁght against multi-resistant pathogenic agents,
47 Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, pp. 1035–1040, quoted after http://
www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/indust.html (last visited 13 August 2012).
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exploration of outer space and deep-water zones, development and containment of
artiﬁcial intelligence, to give just a few examples –may beneﬁt from launching aids
that will inevitably beneﬁt projects that target the world (i.e., the global market); in
this context the distinction between domestic versus foreign consumption seems
irrelevant. The potential competitive dangers of such state engagements are
obvious, and the SCM offers in its part III et seq. appropriate and timely antidotes.
The ‘nuclear option’ of part II, however, would not seem the appropriate avenue to
control abuses of such subsidies.
III.
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s view that certain launch-aid and other
support measures caused serious prejudice to the interests of the United States
within the meaning of Article 5(c) SCM. However, it comes as a great relief that the
Appellate Body rejects the position of the Panel that in a case involving Article
6.3(a) and (b) SCM it is bound by the complainant’s deﬁnition of the market at
stake.
1. This is what the Appellate Body had to say in this regard:
1128 . . . [I]n its analysis, the Panel deferred to the United States’ subsidized
product allegations [that there was – contrary to what the EC had said – only one
subsidized product at issue in this dispute, consisting of all models of Airbus LCA]
rather than making its own independent assessment of whether all Airbus LCA
should be treated as a single subsidized product. In so doing, the Panel failed to
make an objective assessment of the matter, including the ‘applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements’, as required under Article 1 of
the DSU . . . [T]he Panel’s failure to comply with its duties under Article 11 appears
to ﬂow directly from its erroneous interpretation of the requirements of Articles
6.3(a) and 6.3(b) of the SCM Agreement, which led it to believe that it lacked the
power and was under no obligation to assess independently the ‘subsidized
product’ and the relevant product market. In the absence of such a determination,
the Panel did not have a proper basis for assessing whether the alleged subsidized
and like products compete in the same market or multiple markets, which is a
prerequisite for assessing whether displacement within the meaning of Articles
6.3(a) and 6.3(b) could be found to exist as alleged by the United States . . .
1131. Clearly, there is no inhibition on how a complainant may choose to
formulate its claim as to the scope of the ‘subsidized product’ . . . This does not
mean, however, that a panel has no duty to review the complainant’s formulation
of the scope of the ‘subsidized product’. Rather, the panel has a duty to ascertain
the relevant product market or markets in which the complainant’s and
respondent’s products compete. The notion of ‘subsidized product’ and ‘like
product’ is, in each case, to be analysed as an integral part of a panel’s duty
objectively to assess a particular claim of serious prejudice and its obligation to
assess the relevant market under Articles 6.3(a) and 6.3(b).
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This clariﬁcation is to be applauded. It is, of course, the duty of the Panel to
deﬁne whether in reality pain was inﬂicted on other Members by subsidies. That
requires competitive relationships, real ones, and not just the claim of a party to the
dispute. The duty of the Panel to examine what the complaining party presents as
the factual basis for its claims seems a self-evident proposition. The Panel is
supposed to make an ‘objective assessment’48 of both facts and law; that seems
hardly possible with a boilerplate internalization the position of one of the parties
to the dispute. On the basis of the available empirical literature on the LCA
industry, the beneﬁts of a more reﬁned deﬁnition of the product market would not
have been theoretical, but, on the contrary, quite operational for the displacement
analysis. Empirical studies of LCA industry49 suggest that LCA models within the
industry show quite different degrees of substitution between product ranges: LCA
products in the same cluster (deﬁned for example in terms of passenger capacity
and range) compete closely with one another but the degree of substitution between
the LCA models in different clusters vary widely. The importance of deﬁning
correctly the relevant product market is to enable a robust evaluation of
displacement of a product by a product that exercises on it a competitive
constraint. As noted by the Appellate Body50 ‘[a]n assessment of the competitive
relationship between products in the market is required in order to determine
whether and to what extent one product may displace another. Thus, while a
complaining Member may identify a subsidized product and like product by
reference to footnote 46, the products thereby identiﬁed must be analyzed under the
discipline of the product market so as to be able to determine whether displacement
is occurring.’ A similar reasoning extends to the notion of the geographic scope of
the relevant product market. Where the market is cross-border or even global, the
distinction between sales to the domestic ‘market’ and sales to the export ‘market’
disappear, and so do the terms domestic or export market shares. It follows that
any conclusions on discernible displacement of a like product by a subsidized
product have to be made on the basis of an objective determination of the relevant
product market.
2. Of course, what irritates at ﬁrst glance is the geographic compartmentalization
of markets (e.g., Taiwan, Australia, India) whereas one would have believed that
LCAs are exposed to competition in a global market. The key to the Appellate
Body’s approach is the wording of Article 6.3 SCM.51 Its subparagraphs (a) and (b)
48 Article 11 DSU.
49 John Sutton (1998), Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History, in particular Chapter
16, ‘A Complex Case’, on civil aircraft, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 415–471.
50 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1119.
51 6.3 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or
several of the following apply: (a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like
product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to
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both concern effects of state aid in a geographically well-deﬁned market: on the one
hand ‘the market of the subsidizing Member’ and, on the other hand, ‘a third
country market’.
The Appellate Body, as any applier of the law, has to recognize the normative
starting point, even though it may not represent a categorization current economic
thinking would subscribe to.
1117. . . .A plain reading of Articles 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) therefore reveals that an
analysis of displacement or impedance under those provisions is limited to the
territory of the ‘subsidizing Member’ or the territory of any third country at issue.
The manner in which the geographic dimension of a market is determined will
depend on a number of factors: in some cases, the geographic market may extend
to cover the entire country concerned; in others, an analysis of the conditions of
competition for sales of the product in question may provide an appropriate
foundation for a ﬁnding that a geographic market exists within that area, for
example, a region. There may also be cases where the geographic dimension of a
particular market exceeds national boundaries or could be the world market,
even though Articles 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) would focus the analysis of displacement
and impedance on the territory of the subsidizing Member or third countries
involved.
The Appellate Body however mentions, almost in passing in footnote 2462, that
‘in terms of the geographic dimension of markets under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM
Agreement, it may be appropriate to examine the “world market” and the
conditions of competition as they exist in that market’. This, however, is the only
occasion to do so, as the ﬁrst two subparagraphs determine a territorial approach.
IV
1. An interesting economic and quantitative analysis of displacement of orders of
Boeing that could be attributed to subsidies to Airbus is attempted by the Appellate
Body Report in section IX.C.52 The analysis is predicated on deﬁning the relevant
product market as consisting of three submarkets – Single-aisle LCA, Twin-aisle
LCA, and Very Large LCA. This provisional deﬁnition of LCA was selected as it
was not contested by either party. The method of analysis adopted by the Appellate
Body was to examine the trends in the volume of sales and relative shares of the
displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member from a third country market; (c) the
effect of the subsidy is a signiﬁcant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price
of a like product of another Member in the same market or signiﬁcant price suppression, price depression
or lost sales in the same market; (d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the
subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to the average
share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a
period when subsidies have been granted.
52 Appellate Body Report, Airbus, para. 1158 et seq.
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orders of each of the manufacturers to speciﬁc countries, over a six-year reference
period. The analysis is therefore very much along the lines outlined in paragraph
1048 of the Report. The analysis of the orders data over 2001–2006 leads the
Appellate Body to conﬁrm displacement of Boeing sales to half of the speciﬁc
countries put forward by the complainant:53 in terms of unit sales over the period
to these countries this amounted to 70% of total orders. This can be regarded as
signiﬁcant, if attention is limited to just these countries, but much less signiﬁcant in
relation to global LCA orders over the reference period.
2. In regard to lost sales, the Appellate Body Report is careful to deﬁne the term
and the approach needed to identify lost sales ‘caused’ by the challenged measures.
As noted by the Appellate Body Report, this case was the ﬁrst instance when the
issue had been examined by it, under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement. The
Report underlines that the analysis compare the sales actually made by the
competing ﬁrm(s) of the complaining Member with the sales resulting from a
counterfactual scenario in which the ﬁrm(s) of respondent Member would not have
received the challenged subsidies.54 The central element in the counterfactual
underlying the Appellate Body’s Report is that displaced and lost sales for Boeing to
certain geographic destinations occurred because the challenged subsidies made it
possible for Airbus to launch rival offerings at the time it did. But for the subsidies,
there would not have been the availability of competitive alternatives and wider
choice of LCA speciﬁcations, and hence no loss or displacement of Boeing sales
over the reference period would have taken place.
3. In order to ﬁne-tune displaced and lost sales of Boeing during 2001–2006,
alternative counterfactual scenarios including the ‘no-subsidy’ case for Airbus are
considered in the Report. For a consistent approach, it would have been necessary
to develop a global demand growth evolution corresponding to delayed
development of product families by Airbus. Such a counterfactual would have
highlighted greatly reduced pressure on Boeing to undertake expensive develop-
ment expenditure of its own product range. The Airbus Report does not consider
that there would be a different evolution of global LCA demand-growth under the
scenario of a reduced Airbus operation. The common assumptions under the
counterfactual scenarios considered are that the development of LCAs by Boeing
over the whole period and the global demand for all types of LCAs would be as it
actually was during the whole period. An incumbent, dominant or not, has no
proﬁt incentives and faces no price pressures from captive customers to escalate
developmental spending so as to meet or create prospective demand. On the
assumption that Boeing’s product development over the period did not beneﬁt from
53 Ibid., para. 1203.
54 Ibid., para. 1216.
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subsidies, the basic analytical framework is certainly correct, but simulations
reported equate the time pattern of global LCA growth development and
product launches by the incumbent in the ‘no subsidy’ case to the realized
development over the reference period of global LCA demand growth and
product launches. The core dynamics of LCA industry in the form of strategic
interactions between competitors regarding developmental expenditures leading
to product launches that simultaneously drive demand growth, as well as react to
that demand growth, are not adequately incorporated in the counterfactual
simulations.
4. The conclusions55 drawn in the Appellate Body Report on displacement of
sales and lost sales favor, based on the evidential record before the Panel, the
counterfactual scenarios that assume that without subsidies there would not have
been the same development pace of LCA products of Airbus.
4. Conclusions
1. It is a mixed blessing for the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism that the
Airbus and Boeing cases have been brought. If there ever was a constellation ill-
suited for being ‘battled out in court’, it was this dispute between two close trading
partners and military allies, sharing for the moment the lead with regard to large
civil aircrafts. While this is not apparent when reading the Airbus Report –whereas
in the sister Boeing Report56 the strong involvement of the military is obvious, as
the granting authorities are the Pentagon and NASA – it is clear that the European
public authorities granting the subsidies in question did so not the least in order to
avoid a complete dependency on US aerospace technology that would have had the
potential to be crippling on many levels. Regardless of whether these vital interest
connotations would have sufﬁced to reach the threshold necessary for an
invocation of Article XXI GATT, they were (and are) real nonetheless. Certainly,
the United States has a history of active avoidance of having independent
adjudicators look at issues that are of security relevance, and the European Union
has never pushed too hard in this respect, as the last-minute compromise in the
Helms–Burton dispute illustrates.57
Because of the economic signiﬁcance of this dispute, the strong position of
Boeing as a lobbyist, and the rather obvious violation of WTO and EU state-aid law
55 Ibid., paras. 1297–1300.
56United States –Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/
AB/R (the Boeing Report), for which the same Appellate Body Members were responsible that had been in
charge of the Airbus Report.
57 Cf. Stefaan Smis and Kim Van der Borght (1999), ‘The EU–U.S. Compromise on the Helms-Burton
and D’Amato Acts’, 93:1 American Journal of International Law, 227–236.
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by the Europeans, low priority was given to the arguments advanced by those who
preferred a noncontentious negotiated settlement. The result is, of course, far from
satisfactory for the US interests pushing that agenda, given that both the European
Union and the United States were held to be not in conformity with their
obligations under the SCM. Now a dispute that is utterly limited to two trade
superpowers and military allies will feed another generation of lawyers’ children
(maybe even cover their expensive graduate education . . .) and keep academics
busy. While these results may allow us to rejoice, they would seem not to sufﬁce to
tip the balance in favor of an overall positive assessment: a good opportunity to not
use the multilateral mechanism was missed.
That aside, and apart from some of the desiderata mentioned above, this is a
well-crafted Report, in particular given the time constraints: for the United States,
speedy justice in the WTO is of constitutional importance, as is illustrated by its
threat to propose the application of (regular) consensus rule in the COOL case;
given the completely different proﬁle of the Airbus case, the right timing was very
important.58
The dispute DS316 is far from over: the European Union, on 5 December
2011,59 notiﬁed the DSB that it had taken appropriate steps to bring its measures
fully into conformity with its WTO obligations:
[T]he European Union took note of all elements of the DSB’s recommendations
and rulings, including, in particular, the . . . guidance on the way in which
subsidies and adverse effects expire, dissipate, terminate or are otherwise removed
or withdrawn. In undertaking this review, we consulted, among others,
independent experts in: ﬁnancial economics; investor behaviour; ﬁnancial and
cost auditing, accounting and controlling; product engineering; and Large Civil
Aircraft (LCA) ﬂeet management. We have also closely monitored and assessed
LCA product and market developments . . . following the period covered by the
Panel’s review.
As a result of this review, the European Union has adopted a course of action
that addresses all forms of adverse effects, all categories of subsidies, and all
models of Airbus aircraft covered by the DSB’s recommendations and rulings.
Speciﬁcally, in bringing its measures into conformity with its WTO obligations,
the European Union has addressed all categories of subsidy covered by the DSB’s
recommendations and rulings: Member State Financing (MSF) loans, capital
contributions, infrastructure support and regional aid. Amongst others, the
European Union has secured repayment of MSF loans and terminated MSF
agreements, increased fees and lease payments on infrastructure support to
accord with market principles, and ensured that capital contributions and
regional aid subsidies have, in the Appellate Body’s words, ‘come to an end’ and
are no longer capable of causing adverse effects. Additionally, the course of action
58 Cf. above note 43.
59EC and Certain Member States−Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/17.
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adopted by the European Union affects Airbus’ A300, A310, A320, A330, A340
and A380 aircraft, as well as derivatives thereof, as implicated by the DSB’s
recommendations and rulings. Finally, as a result of these steps and other
intervening market events, the European Union has addressed the forms of
adverse effects covered by the DSB’s rulings.
In the meantime, the United States had requested, on 9 December 2011,
authorization to take countermeasures pursuant to Article 22 DSU and Article 7.9
SCM. Due to a sequencing arrangement, the matter is now before the original
Panel: it is interesting, though, that the United States quoted para. 1264 of the
Appellate Body Report:
Without the subsidies, Airbus would not have existed under these scenarios and
there would be no Airbus aircraft on the market. None of the sales that the
subsidized Airbus made would have occurred. As Boeing (or the other US
manufacturer envisaged by the Panel) would be the only supplier(s) of LCA, it (or
they) would have made the sales instead.
That seems to indicate a willingness on the side of the complainant to give a
broad reading to the European Union’s obligation to remove the adverse effects of
the subsidy: the line of reasoning would be that as long as there is Airbus, the
harmful effects of the subsidies can be felt. It will be interesting to see how this
argumentation plays out: the allegedly wrongful birth of Airbus did not hinder the
Appellate Body to accept in United States –Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (DS 353) that the European Union was capable
of suffering, pursuant to Article 5(c) SCM, serious prejudice, as a consequence of
the lost sales that Airbus had to digest as a consequence of US subsidies.
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